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MARKETS FOR TRADEABLE CO. EMISSION QUOTAS
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
This paper reviews a range of issues relating to tradeable carbon dioxide quotas. It
considers the economic principles on which they are based, compares them with alternative
carbon abatement policies, and reviews many aspects of how tradeable quotas would be
implemented in practice .
Cette etude passe en revue un certain nombre de problemes en relation avec un systeme
de contingents negociables de dioxyde de carbone . Sont pris en consideration, les principes
economiques sur lesquels un tel systeme peut se fonder, la comparaison avec d'autres instruments
de reduction des emissions de carbone et les aspects de raise en oeuvre pratique des contingents
negociables .
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all, or part of, this material
should be made to: Head of Publications Service, 2, Rue Andre Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16,
France .
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MARKETS FORTRADEABLE COZ EMISSION QUOTAS
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
I. Introduction
by
Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal'
This paper reviews a range of issues relating to tradeable carbon
dioxide emission quotas, to be called TEQs from now on. It considers the
economic principles on which they are based, compares them with alternative
carbon abatement policies, and reviews many aspects of how tradeable quotas
would be implemented in practice.
The next section sets the scene: it explains why these issues are on the
agenda and how they relate to current issues such as joint implementation.
The principal alternative to a TEQ regime is the adoption of carbon
taxes: Section III compares salient aspects of the twopolicy approaches. It also
analyses how they may be combined. Section IV studies a particular and very
important aspect of a TEQ regime: the allocation of TEQs amongparticipating
countries. These two sections, Sections III and IV, present the key theoretical
perspectives on tradeable quotas and their main alternative, carbon taxes.
The remaining section addresses issues connected with the
implementation of TEQs, analyzing questions associated with the design and
management of a TEQ market.
II. The context of the OECD discussion
The Rio Convention of June 1992 set important goals for the control of
the planet's greenhouse has emissions. Annex 1 countries' agreed to roll back
their emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000. The Convention gave
certain institutions the responsibility for devising policies to implement these
goals: these institutions were the Global Environment Facility, and the
Framework Conventions on Climate Change, on Biodiversity and on
Sustainable Development.
Industrial and developing countries have rather different perceptions
of the issues involved, and these differences are to a certain extent limiting
1Chichilivsky is at the Department of Economics and the Program on Information and
Resources at Columbia University, and wasVisiting Professor at Stanford University when this
document was written. Heal is at the Graduate School of Business and the Program on
Informationand Resources at Columbia University. The opinions expressed in this document
are those of the authors and cannot be held to represent the views of the OECD or its Member
countries.
'Annex 1 countries are the main industrial countries, including the OECD, the former
Soviet Union and the Eastern European members of the former Soviet block
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progress in international negotiations . Developing countries fear the imposi-
tion of limits to their growth in the form of restrictions on emissions and on
the use of their own resources . They feel that most environmental damage
originates currently, and indeed has originated historically, in the industrial
countries, whose patterns of development are at the root of the environmental
dilemmas which we face today.
Industrial countries have a different set of concerns : they fear excessive
population growth in developing countries and the environmental damage
that this could bring about . While recognizing their historical responsibility
for excessive environmental use, they focus on a long term future in which
environmental problems could originate mostly in the developing countries .
In addition to differences in perceptions, scientific understanding of some
of the main issues has emerged only recently. Newly found science makes
it way slowly into the political decision process, because by its very nature
science is highly specialized and is often tentative in its conclusions . The
differences in perceptions and the failure to communicate recent scientific
findings have hampered the international decision making process.
A .
	
The Economics of the Global Environment
The implementation of the Rio goals of stabilizing emissions at levels
not harmful to the climate requires substantial conceptual advances in our
understanding of some of the main issues, as well as the development of a
consensus about the possible policy instruments for tackling these issues .
This is not an easy task because the problems of climate change, sustainable
development and protection of biodiversity are all rather new and complex in
nature . The economics of climate change involves challenging issues related
to economic principles and policies, including for example:
the connections between energy use, energy prices, trade and growth,
9 the optimal distribution of quotas to emit greenhouse gases between
countries : as we shall argue below, the distribution of quotas is not
a matter to be judged only on the grounds of equity, but may have
substantial implications for efficiency,
. the conditions which are necessary for carbon taxes to act efficiently,
the connections between levels of income, optimal property rights and
trading practices in such markets,
the design of cooperative international policies for the abatement of
emissions of greenhouse gases, as provided by Clause 4 of the Rio con-
vention.
In addition to requiring extensive technical work3, implementing the Rio
targets requires a deliberate effort on the part of all parties involved to com-
municate and to understand each other's concerns, to address in depth and
critically the problems and the possible solutions, and to reach consensus.
B.
	
The present practice
Joint implementation is a term which is frequently used to describe a
cooperative venture between two or more countries to decrease the sum total
of their emissions of greenhouse gases . Its origins can be traced to Clause 4
of the Rio convention, which specifically contemplates this possibility. The
experience to date has been of relatively small projects involving five coun-
tries . One is an agreement involving Norway and Mexico, funded mostly by
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) of the World Bank. Mexico initiated
an effort to replace small electric appliances such as light bulbs in a man-
ner which diminishes energy use and carbon emissions. A second project
involves the Netherlands in cooperation with Poland and India. Here Poland
aims at replacing its use of coal in energy production by natural gas, thereby
decreasing its carbon emissions.
In both of these examples the nature of the cooperation is a bargain
between an industrialized country and one or two less developed countries
(members of Annex 2 of the Rio protocol), by which the former, in cooper
ation with the GEF, "purchases" its right to continue its current emission
practices through ensuring decreased emissions from the developing coun-
tries. The Annex 1 country is credited with an emission reduction which it
brought about, although this did not occur on its territory. The experience to
3Theseare issues on which recent research at ColumbiaUniversity andat Stanford Uni-
versity hasmade much progress (Chichiinisky,4,5,6 Heal,11,13,12 MCIib3iSk, andHeal,r,2
Chichiinisky, Heal and Starrett 9).
date suggests several policy issues, which have been the subject of discussion
in the Framework Convention for Climate Change.
C.
	
The potential of joint implementation
The first, most obvious issue is the effectiveness ofjoint implementation if
taken to its natural conclusion: the purchase by industrialized countries (An-
nex 1 countries) of rights to continue present emission practices by ensuring
decreased emissions from developing countries (Annex 2 countries) . Devel-
oping countries currently emit at most 30% of the world carbon emissions.
If the aim is to decrease world emissions, for example by 60% of long-run fu-
ture emissions as is often proposed, then even a complete cessation of carbon
emissions by all developing countries would at best barely attain this goal.
Abatement of the type contemplated at present requires active decreases in
carbon emissions by industrial countries, who are the main emitters . Joint
implementation of the type described above cannot be a substitute.
An argument in favor of joint implementation is that it can lead to im-
provements in the positions of all the countries engaged in the bargain. This
argument is supported by the evidence that the bargain is freely agreed
among the countries involved . If countries do not stand to gain, why would
they enter the deal? These arguments are correct within a restricted institu-
tional framework, but they fail to provide a thorough analysis ofthe situation .
What is chosen depends on the alternatives available . A bargain can indeed
be better than no bargain at all, but it could be worse than other alter-
native bargains which were not within the scope of discussion . With more
information about the alternatives available, a country can typically improve
its trading position. Indeed, the most frequently-voiced concern about joint
implementation is that a few countries could "steal the march" on others by
taking advantage of a thin market with little information. All this is simply a
re-statement of a well known fact : efficient trading requires well distributed
information among all the traders . It also requires competitive trading, which
is in turn a function of the number of traders. Two traders typically do not
make a competitive market. These two principles, market information and
market depth, .are widely applied in most well-organized markets across the
world and are associated with market efficiency. This leads us naturally
to consider a multilateral extension of joint implementation: a framework
in which trading is conducted with well distributed information flows, and
where market depth can be achieved through the simultaneous participation
of all countries .
D.
	
A migration path to multilateral trading?
From the previous remarks emerges another argument in favor of joint
implementation . The joint ventures or "bilateral trading" practices which
characterize joint implementation so far can be viewed as the first step in the
development of a well organized, multilateral market. It is often the case that
bilateral trading precedes, and leads to, multilateral trading . Examples are
provided by the Chicago commodity markets and by the Lloyds of London in-
surance market, both of which started with informal bilateral trading among
a few parties. The challenge is therefore to build -a well defined institutional
structure of which joint implementation represent a first developmental step .
This requires the construction of a multilateral organization with the clear
understanding that today's bilateral joint implementation ventures are to
provide data and knowledge about how the multilateral organization will
work. The eventual aim is to develop an organization in which countries
can achieve an efficient allocation of their resources, through decentralized
trading via well organized and efficient mechanisms.
E. Tradeable quotas
A natural multilateral trading organization is a market in which entitle-
ments or quotas to emit greenhouse gases are traded . Such a market has
a venerable tradition in economics . At present there are three examples of
similar markets in the United States. A sulphur dioxide (SOZ ) entitlement
market has now been trading for a year on the Chicago Board of Ti ade. For
trading to be possible, property rights must be established . In this case, the
property rights were established by the Clean Air Act which restricted the
emission rights of the major utilities in the US. At present trading is con-
ducted mostly between these utilities . Recently new markets have opened
up: futures and swaps on these quotas have been introduced. These markets
are called "derivative" because they trade contracts whose values depend on
(are derived from) the value of an underlying asset, in this case quotas to
emit. The prices on these contracts, and the gains and losses from trade, are
therefore derived from the expected prices of the quotas. An electric utility
company trades futures because it wants to plan effectively the costs of a
projected expansion or reduction of its output, which will require different
quotas from :those it holds at present. The next section will explain howsuch
markets work to correct externalities, and how they can be used to induce a
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions domestically and globally.
III.
	
Tradeable Quotas & Emission Taxes
A. The Pigou and Goase traditions
The problem of global climate change addressed by the Rio Convention
is a classic case of large-scale negative external effects, that is harmful effects
of oneparty on another which are external to and hence not mediated by the
market mechanism. By the emission of C02 a country increases the risk faced
by all countries, itself included, of a harmful change in climate. Hence the
existence of a negative external effect . There are two principal approaches
to the control and correction of external effects-control and correction via
taxes and subsidies, in the tradition established by Pigou,"6 and control and
correction via the introduction of property rights, as suggested by Coase.3
Pigou described externalities as stemming from differences between the
private .and the social costs of an activity. In his vision, these differences
between private and social costs were to be corrected by taxes or subsidies
that alter the private cost of the activity until it equals the social cost . After
correction, one has the relationship:
private cost + tax = social cost
So in the case of C02 emission, there is a private cost given by the costs
of the fuel burned: the social costs include, in addition to the fuel costs,
the costs of an increased likelihood of harmful climate change. A Pigouvian
corrective tax, when added to the private cost, will. bring it into line with the
social cost.
Coase, instead, focused on the fact that goods and services can only
be bought and sold, and therefore brought within the orbit of the market
mechanism, if they can be owned. Ownership of a good or service means
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that people can have property rights in these . Coase then saw externalities
as arising from an absence ofproperty rights : as a consequence of this certain
economically important goods and service could not be bought or sold, and
their provision could not be regulated by the market. Hence in particular
the market could not ensure their provision at an efficient level. The natural
policy prescription from this perspective is the introduction ofproperty rights
for the goods for which they are missing, so that these goods can be traded
and their provision regulated by the market. The application of this view
to climate change indicates that the services of the atmosphere are being
used in the combustion of carbon-based fuels as a depository for C02 , in a
legal framework in which there are no property rights in the atmosphere and
there is thus no opportunity for people to register a demand for it to be left
unaltered . There are in contrast property rights over the ground, so that
this cannot be used as a depository for waste without permission from the
owner, which normally requires payment. Coase's insight is that we need to
mimic this situation with respect to access to the atmosphere.
Pigou's insight has given rise to the dominant European policy approach
in this field, namely the use of corrective taxes and subsidies : Coase's has
inspired the American approach of tradeable permits and quotas, as used
in the USA for sulphur dioxide, lead additives, and water discharge rights .
The key point is this approach is that before emitting a pollutant into the
atmosphere, a firm must own the right to effect such an emission: such a
right is conveyed by the purchase of a TEQ. The creation of these quotas
establishes property rights in the atmosphere. If a firm is forced to buy a
quota before emitting a pollutant, then, in Pigouvian terms, this also raises
the private cost of pollution, in this case by the cost of the quota . Once
again, marginal private costs are changed so that they approach marginal
social costs . In fact, in a competitive quota market, they will be equated
exactly to marginal social costs by the inclusion of the costs of buying quotas .
The two approaches are formally equivalent in important ways, though
not in all ways. A tradeable quota system requires a polluter to buy a permit
before polluting, and this raises the private cost of pollution by as amount
equal to the price of the permit : in this respect, it appears to the polluter
like a tax: it imposes a tax equal to the price of a permit . Both approaches
are consistent with the "polluter pays" principle, which has been adopted
by the OECD: compliance with this is widely viewed as a prerequisite for
fairness in the management of pollution. From the perspective of the policy-
maker, however, there are differences associated with where the main policy
uncertainties arise: we explore these below. There are also differences in the
role of the government in each system: it plays a more central role, and of
course raises revenue, under a tax regime.
B.
	
Historical experience and intellectual traditions
The different intellectual traditions noted above lead to different policy
regimes, and it is clear that these different intellectual traditions have colored
in different ways the policy choices of Europe and the USA.
The Coasian tradition emerged from the University of Chicago, an in-
stitution whose influence on economic policy formulation in the USA in the
last twenty years has been profound and far-reaching. Hence the USA has
experimented extensively with TEQs in several areas: these include the man-
agement of SOZ emissions, management of the distribution of lead additives
to vehide fuels, and management of various emissions in the urban areas of
northern and southern California. The USA finds this approach consistent
with the prevailing market-oriented approach to economic policy. By the
same token, taxbased policies have been an anathema to a political climate
strongly predisposed against taxeshence the rapid demise of the Clinton
a miistration's BTU tax proposal.
In Europe, the tradition is quite different . The Pigouvian tradition
emerged from Cambridge, and is also fully consistent with the French tra-
dition in public economics and economic policy. At the same time, most
European governments have historically had no natural affinity for market
based approaches to pollution management, having perceived markets as past
of the problem rather than as part of the solution . Hence the concept of a
tradeable emission quota regime has been less familiar in Europe: the ap-
proach that has risen naturally to the top of the agenda is a policy based on
carbon taxes.
C. Uncertainty about cost-benefit relations
One of the main differences between tradeable quotas and emission taxes
is in the degree of assurance that they offer to the policy-maker about the
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aggregate level of pollution. The point here is simple, yet important. It is as
follows . With a system of tradeable quotas, the aggregate level of pollution
is determined to be the total number of quotas issued. If quotas are issued
for the emission of, for example, six billion tons of carbon dioxide, then, if
the system is enforced, the total of emissions will not exceed six billion tons .
This much the policy-maker can be sure of in advance : the total amount
of pollution is predictable. There is however an important aspect of the
policy that is not known to her : this is the cost to polluters of the regulation
of emissions to the specified level, as measured by the price of an emission
quota. This price will be determined by the forces of supply and demand,
and cannot in general be predicted with any accuracy.
Contrast this with the situation with a pollution tax : the cost to the
polluter is now know with certainty and is of course given by the tax. But
the aggregate amount of pollution cannot be predicted : this will now be de
termined in the market by the forces of supply and demand. To be precise, it
will be determined for each firm at the level at which the marginal abatement
cost just equals the tax on pollution.
So with quotas, the policy-maker is sure in advance of the aggregate
amount of pollution that will result from her intervention, but is unsure of
the resulting costs to industry and commerce. With taxes matters are exactly
the opposite: the costs to polluters of policy are known, but the results, in
terms of pollution levels, are not . This is a key difference, a key duality :4 in
situations of great political sensitivity, knowing the cost ofpolicy intervention
to industry and commerce may be essential : this is an argument for taxes . In
situations of great sensitivity of the environment to pollution, knowing the
aggregate level of pollution that will result from a policy may be essential,
an argument for TEQs.
1.
	
Threshold effects
This latter point is important in the context of certain types of environ-
mental problem. Consider in particular a situation in which the effect of a
pollutant on the environment is reversible up to a certain threshold level of
pollution which we denote L, and is irreversible after that . One can think of
This duality was first studied by Weitmnan-l8 See also Dasgupta and Heal, chapter
13.10
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many examples : water bodies can cleanse themselves provided that they are
not "too polluted", but they cannot cleanse themselves if pollution exceeds
a certain level: threatened species can re-establish themselves provided that
their stock is not "too low", but if their stock falls below this level, they are
doomed to extinction : ocean currents and the climates dependent on them
remain essentially the same provided that changes in atmospheric tempera-
tures are not "too large", but may change in a majorway if the temperature
change exceeds a critical amount.
In each of these cases, there is a level of pollution below which the conse-
quences of pollution are reversible, and above which they are not and there is
a permanent loss of an environmental asset. It is this threshold level that the
symbol "L" denotes. In such situations, there is a premium on not exceeding
L: the costs of pollution increase sharply beyond L. In such situations there
is a strong argument in favor of TEQs, for these can provide the assurance
that the aggregate level of pollution will not exceed L. One does this by just
issuing a total of permits that does not exceed L. The only way to reach such
assurances with pollution taxes would be to consider the range of all possi-
ble marginal emission costs, and to pick a tax level which ensures pollution
of less than L for any possible marginal emission abatement costs. If the
uncertainty about possible marginal abatement cost schedules is great, such
a tax may in fact be far greater than is actually needed. In contrast, the tax
implied by tradeable quotas-the price of a quota when the total number of
quotas is L will be exactly the least needed to ensure aggregate pollution
less than L.
In many contests, this may be an important consideration in favor of
TEQs: they guarantee that pollution will be within some predetermined
limit. There is considerable scientific evidence of threshold effects in the
damage that results from many pollutants. All of the examples alluded to
above, have a real scientific basis.
Whilethere arebelieved to be threshold effects in the relationship between
atmospheric C02 concentration and climate change, these thresholds are a
function of the stock, and not of the flow, of C02 into the atmosphere. This
means that they depend on cumulative emissions to date, and not on the
'High marginal abatement costs imply high pollution levels for any given pollution
tax, as the alternative to paying the tax is cutting back pollution and paying the maginal
abatement cost.
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current level of emissions. Cumulative emissions change only rather slowly,
and this reduces the importance of the threshold argument in the case of
greenhouse gases .
D.
	
Option values
The capacity to implement abatement policies in a manner that respects
thresholds and so avoids irreversible changes in the physical environment of
human societies is an important one in the context of environmental prob
lems in which threshold effects matter . The nature of this importance bears
further examination . A key issue here is that we often, indeed usually, do
not know how important it is to avoid a change in the environment . For
example, we do not know the importance of avoiding major climate changes,
nor do we know the importance of preserving certain types of species . Of
course, we have some ideas, but they are not at all precise and often they
are the subject of disagreement and dispute. Presumably we will learn more
about these as time passes : a quarter of a century hence, our research and
experience may have led us to a much better grasp of these issues. In this
case, it is intuitive that there is a lot to be said for keeping matters as they
are until we do know the consequences of a change .
This intuitive point can be formalized in the concept of an "option value"
associated with preserving environments as they ares . Preserving an envi-
ronment, say for ten years, gives us the right and the ability, but not of
course the obligation, to continue preserving it for longer after that . If in
ten years we understand better the consequences of a change, then at that
time we can reconsider the preservation issue in the light of better infor-
mation . Not preserving the environment, irreversibly altering it now, tapes
away this possibility, the possibility of reviewing our choice in the light of
better information. So if we are going to learn more about the importance
of environment to society in the future, preserving environments until we
have done that learning gives us the possibility of maldng better-informed
longrun preservation decisions . Preservation lets us make a choice when we
know more about the possible consequences, and dearly there is a value to
this .
6These issues were formalized by Arrow and Fisher' and by Henry14 : this literature is
reviewed in Dasgupta and Heal'° and in Chichilnisky and HeaL8
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The term "option value" is used to refer to this phenomenon because
there is the same structure here as is associated with buying an option to
purchase a security (another form of derivative) : that option gives you the
right, but not the obligation, to buy the security in the future when you
have more information about its value . Any policy which maintains the
environment, and specifically the climate regime, in its present status quo
has to be credited with the corresponding option value: the existence of the
option value is therefore an argument in favor of a conservative environmental
policy. In the climate context, two conditions are necessary for the option
value to be significant : that more information about the value of avoiding
climate change should become available over time, and that climate changes
should be irreversible. Both of these conditions appear to be satisfied .
E.
	
Uncertainty about future regulations
A key aspect of carbon dioxide emission and global climate change is
that scientific understanding of this phenomenon is continuously evolving.
More is known now than ten years ago, and the next ten to twenty years will
unquestionably bring even bigger changes . The problems of global climate
change may come to be seen as much more, or much less, threatening than
currently. As a consequence of such changes in scientific understanding, the
tightness of C02 emission regulations will change, becoming more restrictive
if the consequences of C02 emission are found to be more serious, and vice
versa.
It follows that there is inevitably uncertainty about the tightness of future
regulatory policies with respect to C02 emissions . This uncertainty has a
cost to firms: for example, when deciding whether to select a technology less
intensive in C02 a firm will base its decision on the expected costs of C02
emission over the life of the project . A utility choosing between oil, gas and
nuclear will make a forecast of the costs of C02 emission over the twenty
to thirty year life of the project, as measured by the costs of tradeable C02
emission permits or the likely level of C02 taxes . In doing so it will recognize
the risk of anticipating incorrectly the costs of C02 emission, and will wish to
hedge or insure the attendant risk of maldng the wrong technological choice.
An example of such a risk is the risk of selecting a non-carbon-based energy
source on the assumption that restrictive emission policies will force up the
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Costs of C02 emissions, and then finding that in fact a carbon-based energy
source is the least expensive and that competitors who have chosen that
alternative have lower costs.
An advantage of TEQs relative to carbon taxes, is that they can naturally
be developed in a way which facilitates hedging this kind of risk. Hedging
could occur via the trading of derivatives such as futures or options on TEQs,
a possibility mentioned in previous sections . To elaborate, if a utility antici-
pates a sharp increase in the costs of C02 emission, it will choose the energy
source that is least intensive in C02 emissions. This exposes it to the risk
that scientific research will reveal C02 accumulation in the atmosphere to be
less threatening than previously believed, with a consequent increase in the
number of TEQs issued by regulators and a drop in their price. To offset the
risk of being "wrong footed" in this way, the utility would either sell TEQs
forward, or buy put options on them. In either event it would profit from
a drop in quota prices, and this profit would in some degree offset the costs
incurred unnecessarily by the selection of the least C02-intensive technol-
ogy. In the Chicago market for S02 emission quotas, utilities have already
demonstrated their ability to use such strategies . These aspects of markets
for TEQs are considered further below .
F.
	
Taxes and quotasalternatives or complements?
Although tradeable permits and carbon taxes are generally viewed as the
main alternatives in the management of global C02 emissions, they are in
fact not antithetical : they can be combined in several ways.
1. 1Vlixed domestic policy regimes
A country could in certain cases find it attractive to employ a mixture
of the two approaches. It could have a regime of tradeable C02 emission
quotas, but allow firms to emit more than the C02 quotas that they hold
in exchange for the payment of a tax on each unit of emission in excess of
the quotas owned by the firm. For example, if a firm owned quotas to emit
100,000 tons of C02 and in fact produces 120,000, then it might be allowed
to pay a tax on the 20,000 units by which its emission of C02 exceeds the
quotas in its possession. In such a regime, a firm finding its quota allocation
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too restrictive would have three options:
1 . to reduce emissions
2. to buy more quotas
3. to pay a tax on emission in excess of the quotas possessed .
It would choose the least costly. This clearly implies that the market
price of a quota would never exceed the tax rate, for if it did there would be
no demand for quotas : one could always achieve the same effect as buying a
quota by paying a tax, so that at quota prices above the tax rate there would
be no buyers. Hence the tax rate sets an upper bound on the market price of
a tradeable emission quota. By setting a tax rate, the regulator bounds the
costs to firms of its regulatory policies . This could reduce one of the main
disadvantages of a tradeable quota regime, the unpredictability of the costs
to firms, but at the cost reducing its main advantage, the predictability of the
total level of C02 emissions . For to the extent that a firm can supplement
its tradeable emission quotas by paying taxes, in can in effect create new
quotas, making total emissions less predictable.
In a situation where there is a need for a cap on the cost to industry of
a regulatory policy, and where there is also a need for some predictability of
the total level of emissions, this mixed system may have a valuable role to
play.
2. Quotas internationally, taxes domestically
Another possible combination of the two approaches is to allocate trade-
able quotas to countries, which can trade them internationally to alter their
total allocations ofemission quotas, and then have countries enforce the given
total emission levels domestically either by tax or by command-and-control
regimes . In such a system, a country allocated quotas allowing it to emit 500
million tons of C02 might purchase additional emission quotas to bring its
total allocation up to 550 million, and then implement the national target
of 550 million tons domestically by any means that it chose. Of course, the
commitment to emit no more that 550 million tons would, as already dis-
cussed, probably be implemented most accurately by a domestic tradeable
quota regime, but in principle any domestic policy regime is possible.
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IV.
	
Quotas: distribution and efficiency
To introduce a regime of tradeable emission quotas, we have to create
property rights where none previously existed . These property rights must
then be allocated to countries participating in the COZ abatement program,
in the form of TEQs. Such quotas have market value, perhaps very great
market value . The creation and distribution of quotas is therefore poten-
tially a major redistribution of wealth internationally. This of course means
that it is economically and politically important, and it is important to un-
derstand fully the issues that underlie as evaluation of alternative ways of
distributing emission quotas. A clear precedent for this redistributive effect
of the introduction of property rights at the international level can be seen
in the Law of the Sea conference and the introduction of 200 mile territorial
limits in the waters off a nation's coast . The introduction of 200 mile lim-
its established national property rights where none previously existed, and
these rights could and frequently were distributed by governments to domes-
tic firms . The introduction of these property rights in offshore water affected
a very substantial redistribution of wealth internationally.
Clearly the aim of a TEQ regime is to alter consumption and production
patterns internationally. Any policy designed to alter global consumption
patterns will affect the levels and distribution of consumption. This is par
ticularly true in the case of carbon taxes and in the assignment and trading
of emission quotas, since both aim at restricting the use of energy, and energy
is essential in the production of all goods and services . There is no way to
restrict countries' emissions without altering their energy use, and therefore
without altering their production and consumption patterns . Therefore the
implementation of measures to decrease carbon emissions will have a sig-
nificant impact on the ability of different groups and countries to produce
goods and services for their own consumption and for trade. The distribu-
tional impact of environmental policy is therefore a matter of major import.
This makes the analysis of environmental policy particularly difficult because
distributions considerations are typically the ones where consensus is often
most difficult to achieve.
The allocation of the world's finite resources among individuals or groups
is a central issue in economics, and indeed by itself it practically defines the
subject. Market allocations are often recommended on the basis of their
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efficiency. This means that it is not possible to reallocate resources away
from a market clearing allocation without making someone worse off: there
is no slack in the system. Market efficiency requires three key properties of
markets:
1. markets must be competitive,
2. there must be no external effects, i.e., in the Pigouvian terminology
private and social costs must be equal, and in the Coasian, there must
be property rights in the environment,
3. the goods produced and traded must be private goods, namely goods
whose consumption is "rival" in the sense that what one person con-
sumes cannot also be consumed by others .
In such markets the outcome is efficient no matter who owns what, that is
to say, the efficiency of a market allocation is independent of the assignment
of property rights. Ownership patterns are of great interest for welfare rea
sons, and different ownership patterns lead to different efficient allocations
where traders achieve different levels of consumption and there are different
distributions of income. But ownership patterns are of no interest for market
efficiency as defined here. The efficiency of the market under these condi-
tions, independently of distribution, is a crucial property which underlies the
organizations of most modern societies.
Yet the efficiency properties which make the market so valuable for the
allocation of private goods fail when the goods are public in nature. With
such goods it is not possible to separate efficiency from distribution. A good is
called public when its consumption is not rival; when, to the contrary, what
one person consumes is necessarily the same as what all others consume.
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is a quintessential public
good: it is the same for all of uswe all consume the same amount'. Classic
7Atmospheric C02 is an unusual public good,in that it is produced privately, unlike
centrally-produced services such as defense and law and order. C02 is produced by the
actions of individuals and firms in choosing the fuels that they use and the amounts that
they use. Although we all consume the same atmospheric concentration of C02, the
implications of this concentration differ from country to country, depending on exposure
to the harmful effects of climate change. This does not mean that C02 concentrations
is not a public good: it means, rather, that different countries value this public good
differently.
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examples of public goods are law and order and defense. If these are provided
for one member of a community, then they are provided for all .
The public good nature of the atmospheric C02 is a physical fact, derived
from the tendency of carbon dioxide to mix thoroughly and stably : this fact
is completely independent of any economic or legal institutions . We can
tax emissions, or assign rights to emit gases and decide how these can be
traded. But nothing changes the physical fact that the atmosphere is a public
good. This simple physical fact has profound implications for the efficiency
of market allocations . It changes matters to the extent that efficiency and
distribution are no longer divorced as they are in economies with private
goods: they are in fact closely associated . In economies with public goods,
market solutions are efficient only with the appropriate distributions ofinitial
property rights . Why?
It seems useful to argue by analogy, thinking of the market with a public
good as far as possible as a market with private goods and checking where
the analogy breaks down. This gives us a good clue about the connection
between efficiency and distribution in economies with public goods.
A market's operation requires that each trader has a well defined initial
endowments of goods: the traders' property rights . This is the same with or
without public goods: for example the property rights in the atmosphere are
the trader's assigned rights to use it as a sink for the emission of greenhouse
gases . Traders produce and trade goods freely so as to maximize the utility of
consumption ; the trading activity continues until a market clearing allocation
is reached. Up to this point, the analogy between markets with private and
those with public goods holds in every sense . However this analogy breaks
down at a crucial point : market clearing allocations with public goods can
be shown to have very different properties from their private counterparts.
This can be seen as follows .
When all goods are private, one expects that different traders will typi-
cally end up with different amounts of goods at a market clearing equilibrium,
on account of their different tastes and endowments. This is indeed the case,
and the flexibility of the market in assigning different bundles of goods to dif-
ferent traders is crucial in its ability to reach efficient solutions, because for
efficiency traders with different preferences should nevertheless reach con-
sumption levels at which relative prices between any two goods equal the
marginal rate of substitution between those goods for every trader, and also
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equal the rate of transformation between the two goods for every producer.
This is an enormous task to achieve: it is the decentralized power of markets
which must be credited with this coincidence of values at a market clearing
allocation.
When one good is public, however, a physical constraint emerges: all
traders, no matter how different, must consume the same quantity of this
good. Not by choice, but by physical laws. It is not possible for traders to
consume different atmospheric qualities, even if they would wish to do so
and even if our economic and legal institutions would allow it . The quality
of the planet's atmosphere is one and the same for all traders. This imposes
an additional constraint, a restriction which does not exist in markets where
all goods are private. Because of this restriction, some of the adjustments
needed to reach an efficient equilibrium are no longer available in markets
with public goods.
The number of instruments needed by the market to reach an efficient so-
lution, namely the goods' prices and the quantities consumed by all traders,
are the same with private or public goods. But with a public good these in
struments must now perform an additional task : at a market equilibrium the
quantities of the public good demanded independently by each trader must
be the same, no matter how different the traders are. In addition to equaliz-
ingprices to every traders' marginal rates of substitution and transformation,
one more condition must now be met: the sum of the marginal rates of sub-
stitution between the public good and all private goods across all traders
must equal the rate of transformation and the relative prices . This condition
emerges from the simple observation that one additional unit of the public
good produced benefits each and every trader simultaneously. The physical
requirement of equal consumption by all introduces therefore a fundamental
difference between efficiency with public goods and efficiency with private
goods. All this must be achieved by the market in a decentralized fashion:
traders must still be able to choose freely maximizing their individual util-
ities, and therefore the previous condition of equating each trader marginal
rate of substitution and transformation to prices must still hold. Otherwise
the market clearing allocation would not be efficient. In other words: with
public goods the market must perform one more task".
8Afcionados of economic theory will note that a T indahl equilibrium provides extra
instruments for this task, namely extra prices, by considering personalized prices for public
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An additional task calls for additional instruments . Since the market with
private goods has precisely as many instruments as tasks, with public goods
new instruments must be enlisted . Some of the economy's characteristics
can now be adjusted to meet the new goals . The traders' property rights on
the public good, which are their rights to emit gases into the atmosphere,
are a natural instrument for this purpose, because they are in principle free
and undefined until the environmental policy is considered . By treating the
allocations of the atmosphere's quotas as an instrument, i.e . by varying the
distribution of property rights on the atmosphere, it is generally possible
not only to achieve a market clearing solution but also one where traders
choose freely to consume exactly the same amount of the public good. With
public goods market efficiency can be achieved, but only with the appropriate
distribution of property rights .
A.
	
Quota Allocations: North-South aspects
The physical constraint imposed by the public good is felt most acutely
when traders have rather different tastes and endowments . Tastes are often
difficult to measure, but differences in endowments are measured readily : na
tional accounts provide often an adequate approximation . Income differences
are very pronounced in the world economy, so that one may expect that the
public good problem will have a major effect on market efficiency.
For simplicity one may divide the world into a North and a South, the
industrial and the developing countries respectively. It is pretty obvious that
endowments of private goods are much larger in the North than they are in
the South; in a competitive market with private goods this naturally leads to
very different patterns of consumption and is likely to emphasize the impor-
tance of distributional considerations . The NorthSouth dimension of C02
abatement is therefore likely to be an important aspect in the evaluation of
environmental policy. While this point is widely . understood in the context
of political debate between industrial and developing countries negotiations,
it has not been clear until recent work that the political arguments have in
fact an analytical underpinning. Not only are distributional issues funda-
mental to achieving political good will and to building consensus . Because
goods. Redistribution of endowments can substitute for the extra prices in a Lindahl
equilibrium.
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of the properties of markets with public goods, distributional issues are also
fundamental in the design of policies which aim at market efficiency. Market
efficiency is crucial in reaching political consensus : often negotiations advance
by producing solutions which are potentially favorable to all . Proposing an
inefficient solution means neglecting potential avenues to consensus. This can
be a strategic mistake in negotiations where the achievement of consensus is
key.
B.
	
The distribution of quotas among countries
From the previous arguments it follows that a judicious allocation of quo-
tas among countries must not be viewed solely as a politically expedient mea-
sure designed to facilitate consensus . Nor should it be viewed as an attempt
to reach fair outcomes at the expense of efficiency, or at least independently
of efficiency. The appropriate allocation of quotas within a given world total
of emissions, is simply an instrument for ensuring that competitive markets
can reach efficient allocations . The fact that it plays this role derives from the
physical constraints that a public good imposes on market functioning . What
remains to be determined, however, is the particular distribution of quotas
which is needed to ensure that the market solution will be efficient . Distribu-
tional issues are delicate points in any negotiation and the fact that market
efficiency is involved makes the point apparently more complex. In reality,
however, it can be seen to improve the dynamics of the negotiation process.
The reason is that the connection between distribution and efficiency means
that an argument about distribution is not a zero sum game, as it would be
if all that were involved were the division of a fixed total between competing
pasties. Because some distributions of quotas are efficient and others are not,
some lead to a greater total welfare than others and hence an opportunity
for all to gain relative to the other, inefficient, distributions9 . Here we give a
conceptual overview of the problem: for applications one needs in additions
an analytical framework for computing solutions in each specific case. The
latter requires further scientific studies .
9Although we cannot develop this point here, this is true even in a strictly second
best context where the total emission level being distributed between countries is not
one associated with an efficient pattern of reosurce use overall. In fact, of course, the
connection between efficiency and distribution has long been known to be close in the
context of second best policy choices.
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Under certain minimal conditions a general recommendation can be reached .
We shall work under the assumption that all countries have generally sim-
ilar preferences for private goods and for environmental assets if they have
comparable levels of income . 11 This is of course consistent with different
trade-o$s between private and environmental consumption in countries that
are at different levels of income. A second standard assumption is that the
marginal utility of consumption decreases with the level of income. This
simply means that an additional unit of consumption increases utility less at
higher levels of consumption than it does at lower levels : adding one dollar's
worth of consumption to a person with meager resources increases the per-
son's well-being more that adding one dollar's worth to the consumption of a
wealthy individual. We assume also that all countries have access to similar
technologies, and that their productive capacities differ only as a consequence
of differences in capital stocks . Under these assumptions, an efficient alloca-
tion of tradeable quotas will require that poor countries be given quotas in
excess of their current emission, and rich countries get quotas less than their
current emissions .
The previous remarks imply that the allocation of quotas may have to
favor developing countries proportionately more than industrial countries if
we seek market efficiency. This holds true for any total target level of emis
sions . However, it seems reasonable to enquire more generally if there is
a connection between the distribution of income and the efficient level of
emissions reached. To answer this question one must consider one more fact
about preferences between private and public goods: that environmental as-
sets are normal goods. This is entirely reasonable: it means that the amount
one is willing to spend on environmental amenities or assets increases with
the level of one's income : the more we earn the more we spend on every
normal good, including of course on environmental goods. The final general
condition invoked by our analysis requires perhaps more thought : it is that
environmental assets are necessary goods. This simply means that while the
total amount spent on environmental assets increases with the level of in-
come, the proportion of income a person is willing to spend on environmental
assets increases as the income level drops. This assumption has been cor-
1°By this we mean only that their income and price elasticities of demand are of the
same order of magnitude. We are ruling out radically different valuations of private goods
and the environment .
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roborated empirically in every known study in the US, Europe and Africa,
although such studies typically involve contingent valuation techniques which
can have weaknesses." The assumption can be theoretically justified on the
grounds that lower income people are more vulnerable to their environment
than higher income people. The latter can afford to choose or modify their
environment, while the former cannot . For example, a public park or access
to potable water are environmental assets that have relatively more value to
lower income people than they do to those who can afford to build their own
park or arrange their own water access . Human beings in lower income coun-
tries are known to be more vulnerable to the effects of global warming than
those in higher income countries . We propose therefore a plausible formu-
lation of a fact which has been established with remarkable regularity in all
known empirical studies: the income elasticity of demand for environmental
assets is between zero and one (most studies find it to be about 0.3--see the
references in the last footnote) .
From these facts it is possible to establish that a redistribution of income
towards lower income individuals or countries will generally lead to an im-
provement in the world's emission levels, and generally in the world's level
of environmental preservation. This is because when preferences are simi-
lar and the income elasticity of demand is less than one, a redistribution of
income in favor of lower income groups implies that relatively more income
will be allocated to the environmental asset. If traders choose freely, they
will choose more preservation: in our case higher abatement levels are to be
expected when more resources are assigned to the lower income groups of
countries.
There is another factor that must however be considered . This is that
developing countries could be less efficient in terms of energy use and there-
fore lead to more emissions as they grow. This is certainly an important
concern for the long run future, that is to say in fifty years or so. Indeed,
it seems that such concerns should drive environmental policy today. Every
effort must be made to help prevent developing countries from adopting the
patterns of environmental overuse of industrial countries as they grow.
"This has nowbeendommeated in alarge number of studies in many different countries-
A good reference is the recent paper by Kristrom .is
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V.
	
The Design of the Market
A . Transaction and implementation costs
Any policy has certain implementation costs associated with it .
are rather different in nature for the two policy alternatives under
here. For a tradeable quota regime, the costs are :
1 . the costs of establishing and maintaining a market
2. the costs of transacting in the market
3 . the costs of monitoring and ensuring compliance with the policy.
For a carbon tax regime, one has as cost categories
1. the costs of collection, and, as above
2. the costs of monitoring and ensuring compliance with the policy.
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review
Costs of a tradeable quota system The costs of establishing and main-
taining a market are fixed costs, i.e ., costs that are largely independent of the
size of the market and the volume of business conducted in it . An effective
market requires a legal and contractual framework which defines the com-
modity to be traded, establishes the contractual obligations of the parties
to a trade, and sets out payment and settlement mechanisms. The costs of
establishing such a framework are likely to be large in the first place : as they
are independent of the volume of transactions, they will be substantial on a
per trade basis for low trading volumes, but will become quite acceptable per
trade if, as seems likely, the volume of transactions eventually rises to sev-
eral $US billion per year . They are therefore probably not a major factor in
the choice of policy regime-though it must be emphasized that a successful
market does require regulation and a good legal infrastructure .12
The costs of transacting in the market, of buying and selling, depend
on the nature of the market and on its liquidity. In some tradeable quota
12The securities markets of the US, by general agreement the most active and open in the
world, are heavily regulated and managed by the Securities and Exchanges Commiskon.
markets, these have been quite high: Stavins" cites afigure in some cases as
high as $25,000 per transaction (on transactions which are valued at millions
of dollars) . Such high figures occurred because prior to the development of
the Chicago S02 quota market, markets were decentralized and operated
via brokers acting as intermediaries . The role of the brokers was to bring
together buyers and sellers, so that they claimed an introduction fee as well
as a buy-sell spread . The transaction costs on the Chicago market are now
very much less, and are of the same order as transaction costs in organized
financial markets. Such costs are low enough not to be a major factor in the
evaluation of a tradeable quota regime .
There is one important general observation about the costs of tradeable
emission quota regimes: this is that there is a trade-off between the size of
transactions costs in the market and the level of the initial investment in
market infrastructure . The point here is that the larger is the initial in-
vestment in establishing a transparent well-run market open to all would-be
traders, the smaller are the per transaction costs when the market is oper-
ating. The reason is that a wellrun centralized market obviates the need to
pay brokers and other intermediaries to find counter parties to a transaction:
it also greatly reduces the costs of settling a transaction, and by providing a
standard legal framework and establishing contractual relationships between
trading pasties and the market reduces the risks associated with possible
failure of a counterparty to a trade to perform their part of the deal. In
informal markets characterized by bilateral bargains these risks have histor-
ically been considerable. A well-run market provides a supply of traders, a
contractual framework that tninirni~es non-payment and non-delivery risks
and an organized payment and settlement system.
The costs of monitoring and verifying compliance are much the same
under either policy regime: these are the costs of verifying that a quota is
opened, or a taxpaid, for each unit of C02 emitted. As discussed below, this
will typically not require the measurement and recording of each unit of C02
emitted: a compliance system will typically require quotas to be purchased,
or taxes paid, at the wholesale level. It will require producers of gas, coal
and refined petroleum products to comply with the provisions of a tradeable
quota or tax regime, on the principle that the overwhelming majority of
carbon-based fuels to reach end users will pass through these channels . Such
an approach will limit the number of sources to be monitored to a number
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in the hundreds or at most thousands .
The costs of a tax regime The infrastructure needed to implement a
regime of carbon taxes is quite conventional relative to that required for a
tradeable quota regime, and is of a type already possessed by almost every
government. It is essentially the administrative apparatus need to admin-
ister a fuel tax, which is already in place in many countries . The costs of
monitoring compliance with a tax regime are the same as those of monitoring
compliance with a tradeable quota regime and have been discussed above.
Private sector involvement in implementation The governments of
most countries will probably find it easier to implement carbon taxes that
tradeable quotas . However, it is possible that private sector financial in-
stitutions will be willing to organize and provide much of the institutional
framework needed for a tradeable quota regime, in exchange for the right
to participate as brokers and market-makers in the resulting markets . In
financial markets, such rights to participate are valuable : in many cases the
markets are financed by charging membership fees to the financial institu-
tions who subsequently become the key participants . Several major private
sector international financial institutions have already indicated interest in
becoming participants in a global C02 tradeable emissions quota market.
$.
	
The organization of quota markets
For the full economic potential of a regime of tradeable emission quotas
to be realized, the market for tradeable quotas must be competitive, free of
manipulation, and give all would-be traders equal access to information. It
must also provide mechanisms for hedging price uncertainty. The issue of
hedging mechanisms is addressed below: this section focuses on issues asso-
ciated with the nature of competition in quota markets and the organization
of access to these markets.
A key issue is whether the number of traders in these markets will be
large enough to ensure competition, and whether any of the traders will
have the power to dominate the market. These issues are in turn linked to
the question of who participates in the tradeable quota markets. There are
several possibilities here, with mixtures of them also possible:
international quotamarkets will be inter-governmental markets, purely
for the redistribution of quotas between countries. Participation would
be open only to designated government agencies .
" international quota markets will be open to all firms in all countries,
establishing a truly global market for C02 emission quotas .
" the international market will be open only to governments, but will
be supplemented by domestic quota markets within which firms in a
country trade the quotas that have been issued to or purchased by its
government .
In terms of establishing a truly competitive market, the second option
here-international markets open to all comers-would be the best. Such an
approach would however raise questions about the ability of governments to
implement national policies, as it would allow thetransfer of permits between
countries without any government approval.
The issue of whether firms in a country should be freely able to export
or import tradeable quotas is a complex one. Many governments will have
an instinctive reaction to restrict this ability and retain control of the total
number of quotas in their country. There would in fact be no reason for
restrictions on the export or import of quotas if, and only if, it were clear
that market prices reflected fully the social value of a tradeable C02 quota
to a country. In this case the export of an emission quota from a country
would give it an amount of cash which fully compensated for the loss of the
quota.
Unfortunately there are likely to be many circumstances where this con-
dition is not fulfilled. For example, a developing country government might
feel that the current market price of an emission quota does not reflect the
value to it of that quota at some future date when its industrialization strat-
egy is further advanced and its emissions of C02 consequently much greater,
and it may therefore wish to accumulate quotas not currently needed for fu-
ture use. An alternative strategy, feasible if there is a liquid futures market
for quotas, would be for the country in such a position to allow the sale of
current quotas and at the same time to make forward purchases to cover
anticipated future needs.
In an active market, one would expect to see "maturityswaps" developed
to provide precisely this service: equivalent swaps are routine in government
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debt markets, and are also available in the Chicago market for S02 quotas :
there a utility with a surplus of quotas for the near future and a deficit for
thelonger term may swap thesurplus near-term permitsfor permits offuture
validity.
There are several possible models of what might ultimately emerge if a
global tradeable quota policy is adopted. One is a two-ties market system.
In this case one might see regional markets in such areas as North America,
Western Europe and South America, with all firms and governments in a
region free to trade on the regional market, and then a global market in
which only governments or regional authorities trade to alter the distribution
of quotas between regions.
An alternative would be a global market in which some governments
allow domestic firms to trade directly on the global markets and export or
import quotas freely, and other governments restrict the right to trade on
the global market. In such a case, the major industrial countries might be
expected to permit any domestic firms to trade on the global quota market,
while developing country governments might exercise more control over the
import and export of quotas. They could for example impose tariffs on trade
in quotas, requiring exporting .firms to pay a fraction of the revenues from
exports into a national tradeable quota bank, or require export licenses .
From the perspective of ensuring a competitive market with incentives for
brokers to innovate in the production of instruments such as swaps, futures
and options, the last regime is clearly the best .
C.
	
Design of the tradeable quota
What exactly is the object to be traded in a market for tadeable emis-
sions permits? The fundamental source of possible climate change is the
stock of C02 in the earth's atmosphere: the larger this is, the larger is the
chance of a significant change in the climate. So the ultimate objective of
economic policies is first to stabilize and then to reduce the stock of C02 in
the atmosphere. There is a natural C02 cycle in the environment: human
activity emits CO2, which is removed from the atmosphere either by solution
in the oceans or by photosynthesis by green plants, a process which turns
CO2 into energy for the plant and into oxygen which is emitted into the
air. So to stabilize and then reduce the stock of C02 in the atmosphere, the
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emission ofC02 has to be reduced below the rate at which it is removed from
the atmosphere by solution in the oceans and photosynthesis . One part of
a policy strategy may be to increase the rate of removal by photosynthesis,
which can be affected by the preservation and extension of forests. In princi-
ple, then, a policy has to discourage the emission of C02 and encourage its
absorption.
What are the implications of this for the nature of tradeable quotas?
Damage inflicted depends upon the stock of C02 in the atmosphere, and
not on the flow of C02 into the atmosphere. The rate of emission of a
given total is much less important that the size of the total: it is of limited
concern whether a given amount of C02 is emitted at a great rate over one
month, or much more slowly over a year or more. Quotas should therefore
govern the total amount of C02 to be emitted over some interval, not the
rate of emission . This means that a five-year quota for say 100,000 tons of
C02 entitles the holder to emit a total of 100,000 tons in any time pattern
whatsoever over the five year validity of the quota: it is not a right to emit
20,000 tons annually for five years. The 100,000 could all be emitted in the
first month, or in thelast month. Thetiming of emission might matter only in
one respect. This is that the social costs imposed on the global community
by an incremental unit of emission may be less when the stock of C02 in
the atmosphere is less: in the limit, if the stock in the atmosphere were to
return to pre-industrial levels, there would be no social costs of emission not
reflected in the private costs. However, within the foreseeable future this is
likely to be an insignificant effect, and it seems safe to assume that within
five to ten year intervals the timing of emission is irrelevant to the economic
significance of the emission .
Romtheperspectiveof afirm, however, thereare important issues related
to the timing of the emissions allowed by a quota and the duration of the
quota. A firm seeks to choose theleast-cost technology for a certain purpose.
Supposeforexamplethat autility selects oil as theleast cost energy source on
the basis of present and anticipated energy prices andprices of C02 emissions
permits. Then by constructing an oil-fired power station it will be making
a twenty to thirty year commitment on the basis of these prices, and will
wish to `lock in" these prices to the greatest degree possible. In the case
of emission quotas, this could be facilitated by the regulatory regime in one
of two ways: one way is to give quotas a twenty to thirty year life, so that
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quotas purchased now by the utility at current prices will remain valid over
the life of the power stations that it intends to build . An alternative way
is to give shorter life-spans to the quotas-perhaps five to ten yearsbut
establish futures markets in quotas so that the utility can lock in a supply of
quotas for the life of its power station today at known prices .
From the regulatory perspective, .there is a difference between these two
approaches, i.e ., between giving long-lived quotas or establishing futures mar-
kets in shorter-lived quotas . The latter approach gives more flexibility. In
particular, it allows changes in the distribution of quotas. As discussed below,
the allocation of C02 emission quotas between countries is a politically com-
plex and important issue, and it is quite possible that it might be appropriate
to alter this allocation over time, for -example by shifting the distribution of
quotas over time towards the developing countries. If quotas have a life of
twenty years, a distribution cannot be changed within this time span: if they
have a ten year life, then after ten years a new set of quotas can be dis-
tributed according to different rules . One remark that should be made about
this possibility, is that if there are short-lived quotas and uncertainty about
the future distribution of quotas, this would lead to uncertainty about the
future prices of quotas . Countries uncertain of their future allocations would
not know whether they would be net buyers or sellers, so that future prices
could not be established . So if quota distributions were to be altered over
time, it should ideally be according to a pre-announced strategy.
D. Enforcement framework
1 . Monitoring compliance
There are two aspects to an enforcement framework. One is the monitor-
ing of compliance with the regulatory framework and detecting violations.
The other is responding to violations in a way which ensures that it is always
in the interests of participants to comply.
The first of these aspects is by far the more straightforward of the two.
Arrangements for monitoring compliance have been mentioned several times.
In. particular, we have made the point that to monitor overall compliance it
is not necessary to monitor every possible industrial source of C02. It will
be sufficient to monitor the sales of the major distributors of carbonbased
fuels, i.e ., the major distributors of gas, oil and coal. These are limited in
number and fairly prominent . Provided that the sales of fossil fuels by these
agents are within a country's quota, the total use of such fuels much also be
within the quota . These distributors are of course not the ultimate users of
fossil fuels, and so are not responsible for burning them and emitting C02.
They would therefore not be required to hold permits, but nevertheless their
outputs would provide a good guide to the total emissions of C02. TEQs
would be needed and traded by their customers . In fact, estimates of the
consumption of the various carbon-based fuels in each country are already
available from data on production, import, export and inventories . Such data
is available to international agencies, and would be difficult to falsify to a
significant degree .
It is also possible to monitor fairly readily the preservation of carbon
dioxide sinks such as forests and other large areas of vegetation . The extent
of these can be observed and measured from satellite pictures : in fact, these
are the main sources of internationally-agreed data in this area today.
There is therefore the capacity to monitor annual emissions and absorp-
tions of C02 by countries. However, as noted in the previous section, emission
quotas should not in general specify an annual emission rate: they should
specify a total of emissions over a multi-year life . If all the quotas in a
country have the same validity datesfor example, all are valid from 1995
to 2005-then this does not complicate matters : it is decadal rather than
annual emissions that are monitored.
If the lives ofquotas are not synchronized, matters could be more difficult .
Consider for example a country with two utilities using quotas : one has a
quota valid from 1995 to 2000 for a total emission of 0.5 million tons, and
a quota valid from 2000 to 2010 for 1 million tons . The other utility has
a 1 million ton quota from 1995 to 2005 and a 0.5 million ton quota from
2005 to 2010. Ih this case, emission from 1995 to 2000 could legitimately be
anywhere in the range from 0.5 million tons to 1.5 million tons. The upper
end of the range would occur if the second utility used all of its 1995 to 2005
quota in the first five years of its life. It is probable that with large numbers
of quota-using, firms such. effects would be less significant in the aggregate:
it is also likely to be the case that the lives of quotas will be synchronized.
2.
	
Enforcing compliance
The enforcement of an international agreement clearly poses serious prob-
lems, although there are many precedents for multi-national agreements
which have been respected by their signatories . These include the Mon
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation 'Meaty, both of which limit either environmental emissions
or national sovereignty over power sources and therefore have some element
in common with a treaty on global warming . A global warming treaty would
however be much more far-reaching than either of these .
Ultimately, enforcement could only be achieved by a combination of en-
lightened self-interest and diplomatic and economic pressures: the interna-
tional community has no effective legal sanctions which could be used to en
sure compliance. Economic pressures would be exerted through international
agencies and patterns of international trade: diplomatic pressures through
the usual diplomatic sources. The successful implementation of a broadly-
based global warming treaty would unquestionably pose new challenges to
the international community, and set an important precedent for planetary
cooperation on environmental matters. Successful implementation is related
to the nature of the countries which agree to participate in the treaty: in the
next section we argue that the incentives to comply increase with the number
of participants, and indeed that with sufficient participation compliance will
be in each country's self interest .
E. Participating countries
How many countries, and which countries, have to ratify a global warming
treaty for it to be worth implementing in the sense that it will make a real
difference to the threat of climate change? Perhaps more important, how
many countries have to ratify such a treaty for the signatories to feel that
they will all gain from the treaty and that it justifies their support and
commitment? This is closely related to the issue of enforcement discussed in
the previous subsection.
There are several analytical issues behind these questions. A global warm-
ing treaty is unlikely to have the participation of all countries as soon as it
starts: it is likely to begin with limited participation and to gain support
over time. The group of countries that starts the treaty must therefore be
such that they all feel that the group is durable, and that the group will
continue to abide by the treaty for long enough for widespread support to
build up. Whether or not this condition is met, depends very much on the
size and composition of the initial group.
A key issue here is that the gains to all countries from participation in a
global warming treaty depend on and increase with the number and size of
the participating countries. The costs to each country of participation also
fall as the number of participants increases. There is a sense in which there
are economies of scale in the formation of such agreements. There are two
key points here.
One is that when a country cuts back its emission of C02, it alone pays
the costs of this abatement: however, benefits accrue to all other countries
that would be negatively affected by climate change, because climate change,
if it occurs, will be world-wide. It follows that if one country abates C02
emission on its own, it will clearly be a net loser from this: it will meet all of
the costs, and many other countries will share the benefits with it . Suppose
however that a group of countries agree jointly to abate carbon emissions:
the costs of each country's abatement, as before, are borne by that country,
but each country now gains not only from its own abatement but also from
that of all of the other participating countries. The ratio of benefits to costs
is now much more favorable: the costs to each country are unchanged, and
the benefits to each country are multiplied by the number of participating
countries.
In fact, and this is the second point leading to scale effects in theformation
of abatement agreements, countries' costs may actually be reduced if the
abatement is part of a simultaneous policy move by several countries . One
of the main costs of C02 abatement is the development of new technologies,
and if this is done collaboratively by several countries each may face a lower
individual abatement cost . There is clear evidence of this in the case of
unleaded vehicle fuels: once refining practices and engine designs to cope
with these had been developed in the United States (at considerable costs),
these technologies could be deployed by the companies that developed them
in other countries at little or no incremental cost .
It follows from this that there is a "critical mass" issue in forming the
initial group of signatories of a C02 abatement treaty 13 : the group has to
is3`his point is developed in Heal,ai . 12
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be big enough (size here is measured in terms of the fraction of global C02
emissions controlled) that the gains to each country from participation of the
others are sufficient to outweigh the costs each country incurs. Once such an
abatement configuration in place, problems of deliberate non-compliance at
the national level should be greatly reduced .
Another analytical issue in evaluating the adequacy of a group of signato-
ties to a global warming treaty is the phenomenon of "carbon leakage . This
refers to the fact that if there is agreement by a group of countries which are
major energy consumers to cut back the use of fossil fuels as part of a C02
abatement policy, then the consequent decrease in their demand for these
fuels will decrease their prices on world markets, and so encourage other
non-participating countries to consume more. This could partially offset the
policies implemented by the signatories of the global warming treaty. There
is as yet little agreement about the possible magnitude of the phenomenon of
"carbon leakage", and indeed there are several other mechanisms through
which leakage can occur.
What are the implications of these issues for the group that should be
targeted as the initial signatories of a C02-abatement agreement? Such a
group has to be sufficiently broadly-based to meet two conditions:
1 . it has to form a "critical mass" in the sense of being large enough to
ensure that all members gain from membership and so have incentives
to remain in compliance.
2. it has to be large enough that the "carbon leakage" phenomenon does
not detract from its efficacy.
However, it need not contain initially all the countries who will ultimately
have to join to make it a complete success. It should certainly contain the
major industrial countries, the members oftheOECD. The additional groups
who will ultimately have to join for complete success are the economies of
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, and the major developing
countries such as India and China. It is probably not necessary for all of
these additional countries to be full members of a global warming treaty as
soon as it starts, as long as two conditions are fulfilled:
14A more detailed discussion of these effects can be found in OECD Economic Studies,
No 19.
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1. that they will not pursue policies that will undo the efforts of the sig-
natories of a global warming treaty, i.e., they will not increase their
emissions of COZ to offset, fully or partially, the measures taken by
signatories. In particular, they will neutralize carbon leakage, and
2. they express an intent to participate fully within a specified period of,
say, ten years.
In fact these aims could easily be achieved by all countries joining a
TEQ regime if the OECD countries were allocated quotas which forced them
either to reduce emissions or to buy from other countries, and the developing
countries were allocated quotas sufficiently in excess of their current needs
that they would not constrain their economic development in thenear future.
In effect the developing countries would then be sleeping members of the
treaty for a period, but during this period would be able to benefit from
the sale or loan of their excess quotas to industrial countries, which would
provide them with an incentive to keep carbon emission low and maximize
the revenues obtainable from quotas. Such a distribution of quotas is, as
already noted, consistent with their efficient allocation.
F. Market management
1.
	
Instruments for the trading of emissions quotas
What instruments, apart from the basic tradeable quotas, should be
traded on the markets that form a past of a tradeable quota regime? Therole
of derivatives such as futures and options in facilitating hedging price risks
has been mentioned several times, and is clearly important. These instru
meats, plus various maturity swaps, are already traded in association with
the sulphur dioxidequota market on the Chicago Board of Made. Experience
there to date confirms the importance of these instruments in hedging.
There is an additional argument for the introduction of such products .
This is that derivatives help to achieve market depth and liquidity, and so
improve market fimctioning. In the market they serve two important func
tions: they reallocate risks, as do all financial instruments : in addition they
also function as substitute credit markets, allowing traders with limited liq-
uid assets to trade extensively. For example, trading options on oil futures
requires less cash than trading oil futures . Thus market liquidity is increased
with options.
2.
	
Borrowing & lending vs. buying and selling
So far we have spoken entirely in terms of the purchase and sale of emis-
sion quotas : sale by countries with a surplus over their immediate require-
ments, and purchase by those whose emissions exceed their allocation of
quotas . It is clear that some countries feel an unease at selling, parting per-
manently with, their rights to emit greenhouse gases, rights which they might
need in the future at a different stage of economic development . In principle
they can of course buy these rights back in the future when they are needed,
although there is a risk that the price will then be excessive. This risk can,
as already mentioned, be reduced by the use of futures contracts or maturity
swaps . Nevertheless, there may remain a residual unease about the sale of
emission rights . There is a rationale for this : no one can predict the liquidity
of the TEQ market or the prices in that market several decades hence.
An alternative approach is to allow countries to lend or borrow emission
rights, rather than buying and selling them - or indeed to allow both . We can
conceive of a central bank" at which quotas axe deposited when not needed,
and from which deficit countries borrow quotas . A country with a surplus
of permits that it anticipated continuing for say five years would make a five
year deposit in the bank, and be paid interest on this deposit. After five
years, it could withdraw its permits, or roll over the deposit . Through this
system, a country's total emission rights never change : it never gives them
up permanently, but merely lends them while they are not needed.
The interest rate payable on permits would of course depend on the bal-
ance of supply and demand for permit loans: a large number of would-be
borrowers with few lenders would force up the interest rate, and vice versa.
The interest rate would be affected strongly by the initial. distribution of
permits .
Such a system not only bypasses the reluctance which countries may feel
with respect to selling emission quotas : it also reduces the risks in the market,
because each pasty would be dealing with an international institution-an
"Elsewhere Professor Chichilnisky has written on the case for a `Bank for Environmen-
tal Settlement", which could play this role .
39
international environmental bankwhich would have a credit status similar
to that of the IMF and the World Bank. This arrangement would remove
any counterparty risks linked to trading with countries of uncertain credit
worthiness.
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